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Part 1: Introduction to the Framework
1.1 Purpose of this project
IDRC has recently begun a corporate planning process to guide its work through 2015. As
programs are the living manifestation of corporate strategy, the purpose of this paper has
been to extract lessons from the IDRC program reviews conducted over the last 18 months,
which shed light on how strategy is realized. Our hope is that observations made in this
report might assist the planning effort as it takes shape.
The strategic analysis presented in this paper builds upon work we have been doing to build
robust and appropriate frameworks to evaluate organizational effectiveness and program
strategy in philanthropy. Over the last several years we have worked with over 30 of the
largest foundations in North America participating in the Evaluation Roundtable, a group of
foundation leaders dedicated to improving their foundation’s impact and learning.1 The focus
of the last year has been Evaluating Strategy.
IDRC provided us the following documents that formed the basis of this report2:
 The IDRC Act
 Corporate Strategy and Program Framework 2005-2010
 Reviews of the following programs:
o Ecohealth
o Urban Poverty and Environment (UPE)
o Economy and the Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA)
o Rural Poverty and Environment (RPE)
We also relied on two other documents for source material:
o IDRC Strategic Evaluation of Capacity Development
o Knowledge to Policy
Although the IDRC reviews we examined were independent of each other with different
teams addressing fairly standard questions across different programs, patterns emerged,
signaling the possibility that systematic influences other than those strictly related to each
program’s design and execution might be at play. The question driving the utility of this
study is: How does program performance reflect strategy and how has strategy affected
program performance?
IDRC’s commitment to learning makes a project such as this possible. In its commitment to
evaluative thinking, IDRC has demonstrated a willingness to think beyond the obvious
suspects of failed logic models, or assessments of plan and program execution toward a
systems based understanding about how strategy actually comes about. The issues raised in
1 The Evaluation Roundtable is a community of practice of foundation management, program leaders and
evaluation directors working together to improve foundation effectiveness and approaches to learning. The
authors direct this effort. The Roundtable has been in existence since 1998 and funded by a consortium of 13
foundations.
2 In addition, we reviewed prospectus documents for each program and other back ground documents. These
served to provide context and were not the subject of this review.
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this paper are only possible to observe because IDRC has made the effort to produce
evaluative understandings of their projects and programs and has diligently shared this
knowledge with others in the field.
1.2 Organization of the Report
We have organized the report to create a construct for thinking about the work of the recent
past and to offer a framework to envision its application. It is not meant to be a
comprehensive and exhaustive review of all potential observations about strategy articulation
and execution. Our organization of the material is as follows:
 Part 1: Introduction to the framework: the framework and criteria for thinking about
strategy
 Part 2: Surfacing perspective and position in IDRC strategy: initial application of the
framework to strategy documents
 Part 3: Six Tensions: evidence of strategic tensions surfaced in program reviews
 Part 4: Concluding thoughts
1.3 Conceptual framework informing our work
This review is not an evaluation of the current IDRC corporate strategy but rather an
application of a strategic lens to existing evaluative material. We draw heavily from the
work of Henry Mintzberg of McGill University in constructing our approach to this review.
Mintzberg brings a particularly rich set of ideas about what corporate strategy actually is,
how it evolves and how it affects the work we do. Among the many well touted writers on
the subject, we find that Mintzberg is particularly applicable and well suited for the work of
the public and non-profit sectors—both in his appreciation of the complexity of the
challenges faced and the need to build strong learning and adaptive capacities in order to
succeed in these arenas. Based on our reading of Mintzberg we bring the following
understanding of strategy to this work:
 Strategy is not what we say we do, it is what we do. Strategy is usually defined as an
analytic plan for a defined future. Mintzberg advises us to think about strategy going
forward as “intended strategy” and the strategy that got you here as “realized strategy.”
When examined, “realized strategy” (or what was actually done) reveals patterns of
behavior and commitment, the ways that problems are framed and how an organization
relates to the external world.
 Strategy is always a combination of deliberate and unplanned processes. There is no
such thing as a perfectly controlled, deliberate process in which intentions lead to the
formulation of plans, implementation, and the realization of intended results. As the
graphic on the next page illustrates, realized strategy begins as intended strategy, but not
all of what is intended is realized (becoming unrealized strategy). What remains,
deliberate strategy, intersects with emergent strategy to become realized strategy.
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 Separating strategy development from strategy execution is flawed. In Mintzberg’s
model, strategy is an ongoing process of venturing and learning that supports how an
organization creates strategy over time. “Doing” is the precursor to “learning” and
learning is the precursor to developing a robust vision for the work to be done going
forward. Planning follows, hopefully based on a strong understanding of the
organization—its competencies, how it works best, how it recognizes and appreciates
opportunities, and how it gauges situations where goals might be reached. Problems arise
when strategy formulation and implementation are treated as separate realities. Too often
when a program fails to meet an objective we blame program execution when in reality
strategy development, separated in time and place from the actual work is often the root
of the problem.
 Organizations are strongest when they employ cycles of venturing, learning and
visioning as part and parcel of how strategy is approached. Too often organizations start
with the plan before they know what they can do well and before they have the
experience to understand where and how they have succeeded.
 Strategy is often experienced only as planning—that is the deliberate analysis of
problems, opportunities, costs and environments in order to arrive at solutions.
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Mintzberg pushes us to recognize three other dimensions of strategy—patterns
emerging from what an organization actually does, and what he calls perspective and
position. In Mintzberg’s terms, these are the four P’s of strategy.
 Strategy as perspective reflects an understanding of “who you are” based on the big
view of what your organization is fundamentally about (and how it understands itself.)
Strategy as position is about “where you intend to make your mark.” In the area of
development, strategic position should point an organization to specific sites or arenas to
do specific things to achieve specific outcomes. Strategy as pattern is “realized
strategy,” or what you actually do.
o Perspective is the core set of values and theories about how change comes
about that shape what an organization is— reflecting its sense of how and
where it can be effective. Perspective in the non-profit sector is often based on
its core ideas about how desired social change comes about. We often hear
perspective articulated as: “going to scale,” or “comprehensive community
change,” or “knowledge development and diffusion,” etc. We would posit that
most organizations have perspectives—some weak or strong, but more often than
not, largely undeclared and therefore unexamined and untested. Organizations
with strong and clear perspective can use it successfully to make decisions about
where it can work most effectively and how. Clear perspective allows an
organization to think about the staff it needs, communicate more effectively with
its partners and stakeholders, identify where it can work effectively (or not) and
deploy its resources accordingly.
o Position is literally where an organization aims to have an effect and
contribute to outcomes. In the corporate world, position is where a company
can establish a niche-based competitive advantage over others. Position, as such
defined, is rarely useful in philanthropy and with non profits where few
organizations have the resources to force the alignment of other parties to their
agenda. To the contrary, most donors hope to attract others to their fields of
interest and have deep interdependencies with other funders.
o Nonetheless, position can productively test how an organization deals with its
understanding of its own potential to be effective. Without position it is fairly
difficult to even consider an outcomes framework, as it sets the terms of
performance—where you will succeed, how much and in what way.
Commitment to a position makes success or failure more obvious than in its
absence.
o Recognition of patterns allows an organization to separate the rhetoric from
the reality of their work. Too often, philanthropies, in particular, are given to
rhetorical commitment to unrealistic goals/positions, ignoring their own
limitations or they posit outcomes based upon leveraging the efforts and resources
of others. Again, these theories of leverage often go unrealized.
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It is in this dynamic between perspective and position that many organizations trip
up on in their efforts to be strategic. Perspectives and positions are often at odds
as organizations often fail to take their own competencies as a serious factor in
their goal achievement equation.
o Position and perspective should align and by extension so too should
outcomes, theory of change and organizational competencies.
1.4 Process and application of Mintzberg’s thinking:
 We looked to the Act and the Corporate Strategy document as the “intended strategy” and
the best source material indicating perspective. The reviews provide “data” on the
“realized strategy.”
 We examined the reviews, the Act and the Corporate Strategy for indications of
perspective and position and looked for alignment within and across elements of each.
 We used our own review process to surface larger issues related to strategy based both on
the evidence and the Mintzberg framework outlined above. Each, of our two person
team, independently reviewed the material then discussed “findings” with the other to
seek some level of validation. The most important test of the paper’s observations,
however, will come as IDRC staff engage with the material and find it relevant and useful
to their work.
 We appreciate and expect that material based on real programming would and should
constitute an amalgamation of both deliberate and unplanned processes. We also
appreciate that these processes always produce tensions, not just between the deliberate
and the unplanned but also within each slice of reality (deliberate and emergent).
 We use the word “tension” to characterize issues that surfaced to communicate the long-
recognized organizational wisdom that the pursuit of multiple and competing values,
ends, and benefits inevitably gives rise to challenges about how to achieve balance.
Tension, as we use it here, is a descriptive term, not meant to imply judgment. As we
worked with the material, we came to understand that the pulls in different directions
evidenced by what we saw, is best captured by the concept of “tension.” Identifying
tensions and making them explicit creates an opportunity to learn from them and become
more intentional and effective in managing them. Tensions are largely not resolvable;
they exist because of pressures (internal or external) or vested stakes in their existence.
Nor can perfect or even optimal balance necessarily be achieved as missions tend to
drive organization sentiment around maximizing performance. Further, constrained
resources limit balance and effectiveness. Indeed, what constitutes “balance” can change
as conditions and situations change, so too with what constitutes effectiveness. Being
alert to tensions and, importantly, their consequences, can enhance execution of strategy.
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 We also considered the possible value of surfacing these tensions:
o It allows IDRC to differentiate between problems of strategy and problems of
strategy execution. Issues and questions arising time and again in program
reviews provide the opportunity, if cast in a different light, to think about the
features of corporate strategy that confuse intentions and send mixed signals to
programs that inadvertently get in the way of program effectiveness.
o It allows IDRC to consider what it does best and where it contributes value
toward meeting its mission. In so doing, it can shed practices that may diffuse its
likely impact.
o It allows IDRC to identify where it is genuinely uncertain about its capacity to be
effective and allow IDRC the opportunity to clarify where it needs to venture
more so that it can learn more and learn with more specific intention.
o It points to where IDRC may have opportunities to make clarifying decisions that
may ease some of these tensions.
o It may point to where IDRC might deliberately chose to take a stance filled with
oppositional pulls, but do so with understanding that the source of the tension
emanates from strategy.
We would add that we have not attempted to identify, analyze, and present all tensions we
found. This report focuses on six major areas of tension that we think usefully illuminate the
value of strategic thinking and that provide particularly ripe opportunities to learn and
improve, building upon IDRC’s accomplishments during its next period of strategy
implementation.
1.5 Criteria for understanding IDRC strategy and its role in program:
The following are criteria we used to identify perspective and position. We applied these
criteria in order to arrive at a plausible statement of what the IDRC perspective might be and
to surface where IDRC has established position. What rationales were used? We sought
then to examine whether there was internal coherence within each of these spheres of
strategy and whether we could find coherence and alignment across perspective and position.
Criteria for identifying the IDRC perspective In general terms, perspective can be found
in:
 What an organization values
 What it aims to do and how
 How and what it brings to bear to achieve success
 How it relates to partners, donors, grantees and governments
 How it informs the world about how it works, what it does and what it aims to achieve
 How it directs operations/programs about its purpose
 How it constitutes success
Criteria for identifying position In general terms, position can be found:
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 Where an organization looks for outcomes—at what unit of investment: considering:
individuals, organizations, fields, networks, nations, localities, regions, countries,
international
 Where it chooses to invest and with what rationale: looking at themes, topics, audience,
fields, place
Criteria for coherence and alignment The following indicates coherence and alignment in
this paper:
 Perspective informs position—pointing to where an organization can best apply its
talents, products and resources
 Position manifests perspective—organization works in arenas and efforts where it can
lend value
 Perspective informs view on outcomes (what types of outcomes, level of success desired
and level of evidence that will suffice); position points to where they can be evidenced.
 A plausible theory of change emerges based on organization capacities (direct or
leveraged) applied to settings through programs where value can be maximized and
effects can emerge
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Part 2: Surfacing perspective and position in IDRC strategy
Our interpretation of IDRC corporate strategy is as follows:
2. 1 IDRC perspective and position identified 3
The corporate strategy document signals two main elements of what can be considered
perspective:
 That sustainable and equitable solutions require knowledge and that credible scientific
research of an interdisciplinary nature is a foundation for growth in developing countries.
IDRC approaches this through grants supporting researchers from developing countries
as well as through staff/ program office support, technical assistance, training, mentoring
and through the support of networks.
 That this research must be relevant and useful to policy makers—local, national,
international; that this should influence practices, technologies and laws that contribute to
sustainable and equitable development. This is supported largely by training, mentoring
and networking individual researchers, and training policy makers.
Our shorthand restatement of the dominant IDRC perspective is:
Power through knowledge; knowledge through building research capacity and
influencing policy.
Other dimensions of the IDRC perspective are important as well, as they illustrate the way
IDRC operates and the value it places on: technology as a means toward sustainable and
equitable solutions, research agendas emerging from developing countries, the importance of
involved and informed citizens, mitigation of bias, commitment to gender equity, partnership
with other donors, participation of grantee researchers in international forums, tolerance for
risk, building long term relationships and other factors.
We have created a set of graphic representations to highlight strategic tensions. In each
graphic, two circles or ovals represent the each arena of tension (for example, perspective
versus position). Within each circle we list key elements that define each strategic dimension
(i.e., key elements of perspective in one circle and key elements of position in the other
circle). Connecting the two circles is a large arrow that shows the two dimensions as inter-
related; we have highlighted in red below the arrows how the specific dynamics of the
tension are manifested.
On the next page is a graphic representation of IDRC’s strategic perspective highlighting
“Building Local Capacity” and “Policy Influence” as two central elements of the core
institutional perspective. The graphic then illustrates the connections between these core
commitments and the tensions that arise in trying to realize each.
3 The Corporate Strategy 2005-2010 and The IDRC Act were the main source documents for this section:
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The tension can be noticed as programs seek to operationalize these sometimes competing
core goals. A core question for IDRC Corporate Strategy then becomes: How does a
program accomplish the goal of fostering credible science while attempting to build capacity
to participate in the complex world of policy influence? The struggle to balance this tension
surfaces in each of the four program reviews we examined.
PERSPECTIVE (Overall Strategy)
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The preceding graphic portrays IDRC’s strategy as perspective -- an understanding of who
you are based on the big view of what your organization is fundamentally about as captured
in core commitments and values. We now turn to strategy as position—where you intend to
make your mark. In the area of development, strategic position should point an organization
to specific sites or arenas to do specific things to achieve specific outcomes.
Below is a graphic representation of the tensions within what might be inferred as IDRC’s
strategic positions.
POSITION (Niche)
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building new interdisciplinary fields
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IDRC definition of programs
 Local participation versus attending
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The corporate strategy document does little to clarify how position might be established in
the organization. It indicates a great deal of latitude in topic, field, geography and unit of
investment. It articulates interest in science, especially biotechnology and nanotechnology,
technology and interdisciplinary arenas as well as expressing an interest in innovation and in
staying ahead of the curve in terms of new areas of development and research methods.
Investment in Africa is emphasized but its commitment to four regions is established as well.
These regions are identified as: Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and
North Africa, and Africa.
There is far less articulation of the scale and scope of impact it seeks and where it would be
found except in global terms. The strongest statement in the corporate strategy is as it points
to fields of development and “local research capacity in developing countries” articulated in
the following:
 “IDRC will strengthen and help to mobilize the local research capacity of developing
countries, especially in the program areas of Environment and Natural Resources,
Information and Communication Technologies for Development and Social and
Economic policy.”
But the focus provided by this statement is coupled with the far broader net cast by:
 “IDRC will foster and support the production, dissemination and application of
research results that lead to changed practices, technologies, policies and laws that
promote sustainable and equitable development and poverty reduction.”
The criteria to assess achievement of these is as follows: 1) building a favorable environment
within which research can be carried out and which provides opportunities for individual
researchers in the South; 2) supporting research that is credible, i.e. scientifically valid and
methodologically sound; 3) influencing practices, technologies, policies and laws that
contribute to sustainable and equitable development and poverty reduction; and 4) building
explicitly Southern agendas into current international policy debates and developmental
decision-making at all levels.
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Part 3: Six tensions
The reviews surfaced what we believe to be six broad tension categories, under which most
of our observations fall. All of these tensions derive in large part from oppositional pulls
from either within or across IDRC perspective and position. We derived these categories
after a close read and analysis of each report. They are:
 Perspective vs. position
 Capacity building vs. policy influence
 Strategy vs. execution
 Macro vs. micro views
 Unit of impact: individual vs. other
 Audience priority
The graphic of the hexagon on the next page depicts the tension categories as forces that
assert influence in multiple ways; all emanate from tensions within and across perspective
and position. The hexagon aims to display the tensions from an integrated systems
perspective in which they interact dynamically within IDRC strategy and operations as a
whole. Each tension is described below along with examples of how they manifest in
specific programs (as reported and illustrated in the ENRM reviews). 4
We hypothesize that they are not independent of each other and contribute to program reality
in both predictable and unpredictable ways depending on the degree to which management,
evaluation, program staff and audience emphasize one dimension or another. What is fairly
certain is that programs stretch in often unproductive ways to meet the demands placed on
them by these tensions. We shall return to this dynamic systems perspective and its
implications in the conclusion.
We remind the reader that these “tensions” are not meant to signal easy remedies. They
provide instead a way of talking about dilemmas and differences in strategic perspectives
within an organization. These tensions, while not necessarily resolvable or certainly not
easily resolvable, can be discussed and managed.
4 These tensions were not referenced in the reviews as such. Rather they were illustrated as independent issues
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3.1 Tension: The Challenge of Aligning Perspective and Position
The dual (and dueling) perspectives of building capacity and policy influence surfacing in the
corporate strategy raise issues in each of the reviews and allow programs to expand into
multiple and simultaneous positions. Bringing these dimensions together surfaces more
tensions. As programs grapple with the tension inherent within the IDRC perspective
coupled with ambiguity in position, issues such as where to look for impact and why quickly
surface.
The graphic on the next page depicts the relationship between strategic perspective and
strategic position, and the tensions that arise in that relationship. The desirability of
alignment between perspective and position raises a central question: How does strategic
perspective inform strategic position? Reviewers seek to understand each program—what it
is, what it intends to do, where it is executed in terms of program outcomes and impact but
(for the most part) do not look beyond program execution to identify the sources of diffused
intentions, resource allocation and actions—all emanating from tensions in strategy.
Reviewers engage their task with the tacit assumption of finding an expected logic between
the operational realities of a program and IDRC’s strategic perspective.
Alignment, the organizational literature shows, is never perfect. The issue is coherence and
integration so that perspective and position are not in silos, or treated as discrete but only
vaguely connected checklists, each relatively self-contained. In other words, alignment and
coherence are demonstrated by how each program makes a plausible case for IDRC’s
investment in capacity building and policy influence in terms of why, where and toward what
end.
Considering IDRC’s perspective and position on the issue of technology is illustrative.
IDRC’s Corporate Strategy document clearly illustrates a deep interest in investment in
technology along with belief in its power to reach the goals of sustainable and equitable
development. This is a perspective statement, albeit one that goes no further in defining how
technology (demand) should be advanced, where, or in what ways. The reviews available to
us were relatively silent on technology influence except to note that investment in technology
was limited to technology adaptation and adoption. This silence prompts us to urge IDRC to
make the role of technology more explicit in its corporate and program strategies.5
These tensions may become most apparent when an evaluative lens is applied to the IDRC
programs particularly in light of the organization’s ambiguity in position. When looking to
identify success, evaluators cast the net broadly but focus in on one dominant domain of
effects. It became clear to us that in the absence of clarity on the relative weight to apply to
the two arms of the IDRC perspective—influencing policy and building individual research
capacity (and, we assert, also toward building research fields) that program and evaluation
staffs and their evaluators default to applying the most available and clearest metric—the
scientific merit of the research produced. We found this to be so in each of the reviews. But
we also found evaluators struggling mightily for a better understanding of program intentions
around building capacity to influence policy.
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Tensions about resource allocation also emerge. Each review highlights limited staff time as
they attempt to mentor individuals in the ways necessary to meet the standards of scientific
rigor imposed by corporate strategy and evaluations. While perhaps an artifact of the terms
of reference guiding each review, most of the reviews failed to struggle sufficiently with the
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a cascade of potential outcome expectations and perhaps obligations for each program to
meet. This reflects the tension between the desirability of being guided by overall strategic
perspective versus concrete choices necessary, in light of resource, political and other
constraints.
3.2 Tension: Capacity Building vs. Policy Influence
IDRC attempts to straddle the demands of these two goals. We believe that this tension is
perhaps the central force shaping program performance, affecting programs in many ways
including how resources are deployed, communications with stakeholders and, most
importantly, how programs think about and organize themselves toward success.
.
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Each program under review seeks to build capacity in research and by so doing affect policy
in substantive ways. Each program seeks to affect change principally through the investment
in individual researchers to build their research capacities and bolster their abilities to work
with policy makers. In the reviews capacity building outcomes tend to take the form of
traditional measures of scientific output. Evidence of policy influence was far more difficult
to identify and program reviewers tended to seek evidence of any kind. One program alone
used 13 major targeted areas by which to gauge success.6 Similarly large and widespread
indicators were used in each review.
In the face of this challenge program reviewers placed a heavy emphasis upon indications of
traditional academic success and by these measures the programs have done fairly well.
Where achievement is questioned, caveats surface about modifying expectations because of
short program time spans. The level of success is not found to be as high in programs with a
greater emphasis on participatory action research, where the “research” is embedded in a
non-traditional method of deep engagement with stakeholders.
Standards of research excellence invariably force a conflict for the individual researcher as
opportunities for publication and promotion direct them toward more traditional lines of
academic work.7 Program support for research in new and interdisciplinary fields or using
participatory methods, in all likelihood runs in direct opposition to these powerful career
forces.
If building research capacity is to aggregate into a sufficient sum of influence, we need to
question whether individuals actually stay in the field supported and whether they continue
with their interests in affecting policy. The Economy and the Environment Program in
Southeast Asia has understandably experienced major problems in retaining its supported
researchers in one country. The report states: “Ironically EEPSEA success in developing
local economists’ skill generated it greatest challenge: the rapid movement of individuals out
of environmental economics research into other fields or out of research altogether. The
supply of Cambodians with economic analysis skill is small and the demand by the many
international organizations located in Phnom Penh is high.” The report goes on to note that
60% of the Cambodians trainees are no longer involved in environment economics research.
6
The UPE program illustrates this problem. This one program, of relatively small size, with vast geographic scope is
assessed on the following: reach and effectiveness at promoting the dissemination, communication and utilization of
research findings, the contribution of the program to influencing policy, the contribution of the program to building or
strengthening the capacities of researchers, organizations, research users and institutions, influence on technology
development, influence on shaping relationships among partners and stakeholders, researchers and networks, impact on
changes in environment conditions, state of urban poverty, impact on increasing understanding of gendered perspectives in
the field, and effects and contributions of research to international , policy and academic debates, discourse and
understanding. From Scope of Work document authorizing this evaluation.
7 Even when researchers in non academia based institutions are supported, reviewers applied standards evolving
from norms of academic success.
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So too, the Ecohealth reviewers notice a drift within the program toward more medically-
oriented research rather than that originally emphasized by the program. The reviewers note:
“Concern was expressed that the strength of the original emphasis on community based
participatory research may be compromised by an increased focus by IDRC on more
traditional concepts of health research (surveillance, prevention and control of emerging
diseases, in particular vector borne) rather than health in it broader context particularly with
regard to poverty and social empowerment.” Whether the reviewers are correct or not in their
interpretation of this issue, applying a strategic lens leads one to consider whether the career
market for those emphasizing interdisciplinary and non-traditional research approaches is
more limited than that offered by more traditional forms of medical research, and therefore
the strategic implications of this difference are noteworthy.
All programs fall short of meeting the kinds of policy effects implicated by the corporate
strategy and by the IDRC Act and where policy effects are highlighted, for the most part,
they are of a fairly limited or person specific nature. Where more significant success has
emerged, government partners have had a major role in the process.8
Ecohealth reviewers call for the need for a theory of change applicable to policy influence.
UPE reviewers point to the gaps in understanding as researchers involved in this
participatory action research program become more involved in the demands of urban change
on the ground. The evaluators note the complexity of policy change of this nature and the
need to be conversant if not skilled in issues of urban policy such as finance, land access, and
municipal government that surround urban environmental issues.
No one at IDRC would deny the complexity of the policy process and the enormous work
involved, but we feel compelled to raise the hypothesis that programming built around the
capacities of individual researchers to affect real change must either be so selective around
policy change “readiness” that few opportunities for grantmaking exist or that the grant
making must inevitably ignore the depth of challenges faced if working policy-research
partnerships where policy makers lead the agenda, are to be forged. One review made the
point clearly: “Working with policy makers implies new thinking and strategies and the
capacity of FC (Focus City) teams in this regard is understandably low.”
Looking to Ecohealth, the reviewers sum up their critique along these same lines:
1. Lack of clear theories of change and measureable outcomes in the design of the
projects especially related to achieving core objectives of health promotion, capacity
building, and policy influence;
2. Insufficient engagement of policy actors (and in some cases the full range of
multidisciplinary actors) in the design and implementation of the work
3. Uneven scientific quality of outputs and lack of a systematic peer review strategy;
4. Inadequate strategies for effectively capturing, analyzing, communication and
dissemination of research and policy results.
8 RPE report: “Where RPE has partnered directly with government the investment has yielded tangible and
robust outcomes at the policy and operational levels.”
19
While we might agree with the general direction of their conclusions, we question the
implied lack of interdependence among these identified problems.
The nature of policy change is highly embedded in complicated political processes shaped by
relationships, power, finance, values and knowledge. The UPE program review hints at what
such a more sophisticated theory of change would require, going forward:
“If the UPE Program is to achieve policy influence in the future, then a clear process
needs to be established at project appraisal. Invitations to participate in workshops are
not sufficient. Successful stakeholder engagement across communities, researchers
and government officials depends upon early buy-in whereby all stakeholders are
assigned tasks and responsibilities over the entire process of the project.
Responsibilities lead to ownership of the project and in the end, advocacy for policy
change.”
IDRC places a large bet on the power of knowledge to influence positive change in
development. The context of the policy process, however, does not accommodate to research
and the demands of its specific organizational culture; rather the reverse is true. This work
is time consuming and requires its own set of high level skills to do well. This raises a
central observation at the heart of IDRC’s work: spending time cultivating policy makers
may be fundamentally at odds with the time and effort required and incentives built into
academic careers.9
3.3 Tension: Strategy vs. Execution
The tension between “strategy” and “execution” in many ways might be considered the run-
off from the tension between perspective and position, which is: how are programs meant to
reflect corporate strategy? No review articulated the particular rationale for a program in as
far as it was expected to advance corporate strategy. The graphic below illustrates a range of
issues emerging from this tension.
9 We recognize that IDRC supports research in a range of institutions including NGOs and policy centers. We
also recognize that academic careers may not be the path for some segment of the researchers supported.
Nonetheless, all of the reviews attempted to apply standards of rigor that derive from academia and this
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coordinated or coherent approach to dealing with gender as an important differential
in research projects. The treatment of gender varied across projects and interviewees.
Gender issues were included well in some projects, and dismissed in others as
irrelevant. In West and Central Africa, the Review Team observed that gender was
visibility addressed as an important differential in the research process in 3 out of 10
projects visited even though all the interviewees supported the importance of gender
in development research. In addition some interviewees in other regions felt that other
factors such as ethnicity, migration and the aging of the population were equally
important factors for closer attention.”
Is this a matter of strategy failure or execution failure? The field of evaluation has long
distinguished between idea failure versus implementation failure, and emphasized the
importance of being able to tell the difference. When something doesn’t work, is it because
it’s a “bad idea” (e.g., poor theory or weak strategy) or because of “bad implementation.”
When gender strategy execution is not working well, as raised in the Ecohealth review, is it
because the strategy needs further work (gender integration is an example of strategic
position), or is it because field staff lack the skills and commitment to execute the strategy
(implementation failure), or, of course, some combination? We are suggesting that IDRC
program reviews would contribute more to evaluating strategy if reviewers were attuned to
and asked to distinguish between strategy versus execution issues.
Our review of the material illustrated four types of issues arising during program
implementation:
1. The reviews had difficulty ascertaining what to value in each program and how much
and to what end. As discussed earlier there was a proliferation of indicators that were
at times logically conflicting. Too often problems like this emerge from strong
differences between or among levels or units in an organization. These differences
only pile up over time without real efforts to sort through disagreements and expose
them to reasonable tests of “existence” proof. Rather than managing authentic
tensions around what works, we see an accrual of interpretations of strategy that foil
efforts at alignment and ultimately diffuse capacity to be effective. And in many
cases, the issues may be execution rather than strategy.
2. There were multiple instances where reviewers and grantees pointed to problems in
execution that very well may have stemmed from confusions in strategy. The
question becomes: how to tell whether a problem is one of strategy or execution.
While IDRC perspectives are acknowledged, they are executed with very different
degrees of emphasis and in all likelihood different degrees of implementation quality.
For example, no review had sufficient information to make reasonable judgments
about the joint contribution of the two strategic arms of IDRC’s work—capacity
building and policy influence.
3. Constrained capacity to learn from success, mistakes or failure were noted. Too
many indicators in too many arenas and at multiple levels will limit IDRC’s ability to
understand the value it brings to an enterprise, which undoubtedly it does. In the
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absence of more clarity about its intentions, it is virtually impossible to do more than
broadly speculate about progress. It is also difficult to make good assessments about
emergent phenomena as actors likely find themselves without a reliable compass.
The challenge becomes one of building competence to think and act under conditions
of complexity and uncertainty but supported with enough capacity to have
information, discern patterns and make reasonable guesses and then have the means
to learn from these guesses.
4. As the Mintzberg framework emphasizes, intended strategy as planned is never fully
executed as planned. Realized strategy is a combination of some aspects of what was
intended plus what emerges along the way. Mintzberg and other organizational
theorists are quite emphatic about this point. Intended strategies are never fully
implemented as planned – and cannot be and, no less importantly, they should not be.
These facts of strategic life make it all the more important to be able to distinguish
appropriate and perceptive change in strategy implementation from those that result
from flawed execution, lack of skill, resistance in the field, or even incompetence.
The skills to implement programs and projects are quite different from the skills
needed to be a fine researcher. (One has to look no farther than any university to
appreciate the different skill sets involved between administration and research, and
the consequences of failing to appreciate the importance of administrative training to
support high quality strategic execution, especially in managing tensions.) In our
reading of program reviews, the reviewers tended to treat problems as conceptual
(e.g., need a clearer theory of change) and looked for conceptual solutions (more
clarity) as opposed to surfacing execution problems as such..
“Execution trumps strategy, every time,” is the title of a speech given to the Evaluation
Roundtable by Dr. Steven Schroeder, a former foundation executive, as he recounted his
efforts to eradicate tobacco use in the United States. His greatest lesson in his work on this
campaign was his recognition that a priori strategy along with post hoc evaluation had little
to do with the decisions that were made during implementation. Strong execution backed up
by solid information was his key to decision making in his ground-breaking work at the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
The tension between strategy versus execution has long been the subject of attention and
debate in the business world. For many years, the importance of strategic planning and
strategy development received primary emphasis. But recent business books have
emphasized execution, as in these best-selling titles:
Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done by Larry Bossidy, Ram Charan, and
Charles Burck (2002)
Execution Premium by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton (2008)
Execution Revolution: Solving the One Business Problem That Makes Solving All Other
Problems Easier by Gary Harpst (2008)
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One lesson from these experts is that execution is not a lower-down-in-the-organization issue
while strategy is the purview of senior management. Senior management, they argue, has to
attend to execution every bit as much as strategy. Therein lies the tension. How to attend to
both? This often manifests itself in another tension we want to highlight, that between macro
and micro perspectives, to which we now turn.
3.4 Tension: Macro vs. Micro
In introducing the terms “macro” and “micro,” we are not referencing only the traditional
economic distinction. By “macro” we are referring to big picture, global strategy
commitments (the view from 10,000 meters) in contrast to the on-the-ground, in-the-trenches
experience of strategy. The global corporate strategy offers insight into the many and deep
problems of the developing world. Programs, however, support relatively small and
numerous projects throughout the world. This creates programmatic and evaluation
confusion regarding aims and progress, especially with regard to translating macro strategic
commitments into concrete, context-specific project activities at the micro level. The graphic
below summarizes the macro versus micro strategic perspectives, and examples of the
tensions that arise in navigating between them. The next page offers concrete examples of
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An example of the macro versus micro tension is the challenge of gender integration and
analysis cited earlier. The macro strategy makes a strong commitment to “gender justice” but
at the micro level, “gender issues were included well in some projects, and dismissed in others
as irrelevant” (Ecohealth Program Review). There is clear tension between the macro
commitment and the micro variation in which local projects determine priorities.
Another example, we believe, is the common recommendation in program reviews that project
processes and pilot interventions be better modeled. Aligning overall program theories of
change with specific project models of change arises as an issue in all program reviews.
Ironically, IDRC’s work on Outcome Mapping as an approach to modeling interventions is
widely appreciated and used by many development agencies, and would have much to offer in
strengthening program and project modeling, but appears relatively little used within IDRC
based on the lack of citations in the program reviews. The macro perspective on the
complexities of development incorporated in Outcome Mapping seems to have had quite
mixed reception and use at the micro level within IDRC.
Participatory research approaches show similar variation, from exemplars of participatory
action research to projects with no participatory component. Such variation is to be expected
and we are not suggesting that IDRC should impose uniformity; quite the contrary. It is
precisely because of the commitment to local sensitivity and adaptability that tensions will
arise about how to interpret and implement macro strategic commitments.
To get to the next level of strategy evolution, IDRC has the opportunity to do a better
crosswalk between the organization’s obviously deep understanding of the large scale forces
affecting development and the specific programs funded that operationalize those
understandings at the micro level. Tensions can be turned to advantage when guidance is
offered at the micro level about how to prioritize, optimize, and execute macro commitments.
Questions to guide considerations of macro-micro tensions include:
 How do IDRC’s international partners and audiences learn from how IDRC moves
between macro commitments and micro considerations and sensitivities?
 How does IDRC leverage its resources by making macro commitments then bringing
others to the table to invest in or better understand an important issue within a
particular context?
 How does the agenda on field building in new and cutting edge fields advance the
mission of IDRC while creating opportunities at the local level before those fields are
well-established?
The macro-micro tension leads to yet another related tension: alternative, competing or even
conflicting units of impact. Impact at the macro level looks quite different from impact at the
micro level (e.g., elimination of a global disease like polio versus adopting a specific
ecohealth practice locally). Different evaluation criteria, measures, and methods pertain
because macro and micro changes focus on different units of impact, our next topic.
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3.4 Tension: Unit of Impact
In large part, the issues noted here reflect the absence of a more unified theory of change at
the corporate level then again at the level of each program. This is not to say that IDRC
should aim to develop and execute each program in a uniform manner or that every program
should pursue the same ends. Each program, however, would gain from pursuing more
clarity about their basic theory of change and how funded projects reflect that. The reviews
tended to pursue outputs and “outcomes” in a checklist and grant by grant fashion with
virtually no aggregation up into reflections on overall program strategy. Output achievement
was often “counted” and reported by percentages looking across the entire set of grants and
without context that would allow the data to make meaningful sense. It is not clear to us
whether this is a problem emanating from the reviews (how they were structured and /or
conducted) or that the problem reflects a lack of clarity within the programs. Our experience
tells us that strategy clarity on this issue goes a long way toward evaluation (review) clarity
and following the maxim that “nature abhors a vacuum” reviewers filled the vacuum with
what they could surface, what was “countable,” and what seemed to be more rather than less
clear such as counting publications.
While this conflation of unit of impact affects evaluation in important ways, it is far more
significant to the decisions made by program leaders. Take for instance the degree to which
a program aims to advance a field of research and endeavor. What then is the role of an
individual project toward advancing this overarching goal? We can imagine many different
answers to such a question but they all reflect upon the unit of impact of the field and not on
project by project outputs per se.
On the question of impact, for instance, how does a program decide whether sufficient funds
have been invested to achieve an outcome or to reach its goal and what to emphasize within
projects when they hit the inevitable wall of having too much to do and too little time and
funding to do it? As is the case with the vast majority of North American foundations, an
important corporate question is: how do the programs add up to a realization of its goals and
mission. The programs too, face the analogous question: how do the projects adds up to
advance its aims.
The reviews offered their strongest insight into this kind of tension when raising questions
such as those cited about the Cambodian market for economists. Our take away from the
point raised in this review was that program staff need to consider career market dynamics
not just for their specific field of endeavor, in this case environmental economics, but the
dimensions of the country specific human resource pool (different sizes of population) and
then how the demand for the home discipline (economics) might compete with the goal of
bringing entrants into the field of environmental economics. The same points could be made
about the drift evidenced in the Ecohealth program from health-oriented research to medical
model research.
In the UPE and RPE programs, where participatory research methods dominate, the unit of
impact tension plays out in a different, although just as important, manner. Here IDRC
necessarily migrates from individual researchers to a collective process involving
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organizations, citizens, and policy makers. It was not clear from the reviews that the theory
of change shifted to accommodate the greater complexity, different organizational types and
the longer time frame needed for change to occur. Measures of success were mostly the
same as those applied across the board. The UPE review did, however, push for more
thought about the nature of urban change and the need to incorporate the skill and thinking
that this domain requires in order to be effective.
We fully understand that IDRC staff knows well that different settings and problems require
different solutions, approaches, resources, hand-holding, skills and time frames. The
heterogeneity of the developing world is well acknowledged in the corporate strategy.
However, in implementation, (at least as reflected in the reviews) uniformity is valued. Our
experience with North American foundations tells us that this kind alignment issue may arise
from several sources: goal ambitions may outstrip resource availability, including funds and
program staff; strategies (and resources) to support individuals might not transfer in whole
cloth to efforts where the central actors are organizations; also programs supporting research
may have been exported into a policy change agenda without accommodation to the full
demands of policy change. Our experience tells us that different organizational stakeholders
have different interests and rather than being managed or tested, their interests tend to accrue
into programs with the potential outcome of diluting effects in all areas of interest.
The challenge here is not to layer on new themes or to develop numerous theories of change
reflecting generic action, but to struggle to wed the core IDRC perspectives in a coherent
way and grapple with how the perspective might work in the settings chosen. From this,
programmatic theories of change can emerge with more appropriate and aligned ways to
measure success and learn while doing. We encourage IDRC to think through how strategy is
likely to bring about desired change and to monitor “realized strategy” attuned to the clarified
purpose and settings of each program.
27
UNIT of IMPACT TENSIONS
TENSIONS

The graphic above is illustrative of just one of unit of impact tensions, that between
individuals and institutions. We have noted others as well: efforts that espouse to change
communities, call up quite a different set of interventions than that used to change individual
behavior. The same can be said for change in international agendas, change in population
health, changes in the vibrancy and effectiveness of “fields” etc. These targets of change
require both different and different magnitude of intervention and also very different
measures of success and approaches to evaluation. An example of unit of impact tensions is
highlighted in the cross-case study of capacity undertaken by IDRC. This important analysis
notes that:
“In IDRC’s view, change occurs first and foremost at the individual, not the
institutional, level. Several case studies remark that working along problem or
thematic lines, at the level of individual research projects, with individual researchers
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The report goes on to note that “this reveals an interesting dissonance between what IDRC
does and what it says it does” for “according to IDRC corporate documents, the Centre
identifies organizations as principal targets for capacity development support.”
The tension between achieving individual capacity outcomes versus organizational capacity
outcomes is quite palpable in the program reviews. On the face of it, these two levels of
outcomes intersect and ought to be mutually reinforcing. In point of fact, as the extension
evaluation literature on the subject shows, changing individuals and changing organizations
involve fundamentally different theories of change, different execution skills, different
timelines, and different measures of success.
The cross-case analysis study also shows how unit of impact tensions intersect with the over-
arching tension between capacity versus policy influence that is at the heart of IDRC’s
strategic perspective. The report concludes:
“IDRC has paid closer attention to, and has therefore achieved more substantive
results in, strengthening the capacities of organizations to conduct and manage
research, with comparatively fewer results in strengthening the capacity of partners to
use research results and to create or mobilize research links to systemic policy
formation or change.”
These different types of results (capacity versus policy influence) flow directly from IDRC’s
strategic perspective and involve different units of impact: researchers versus policy makers.
Both are clearly important. But different theories of change are involved, including different
skills and relationships. Projects are expected to show results in both areas. As priorities are
established, choices have to be made about where to place the emphasis – and therein arises
the tension.
Another unit of analysis tension arises in the aim to achieve results with partners and people
in communities, the ultimate intended beneficiaries of development initiatives. The UPE
program review observes that:
“Participatory practices can be assessed at two levels. Effective partnership among
stakeholders is a vital element in the success of a project, and active participation of
the beneficiary community is a prerequisite for its sustainability. The Focus Cities
projects, being larger and more complex, exemplify the importance of participatory
practices and effective stakeholder engagement, a great deal of which depends on the
institution leading the project.”
Elaborating on these different units of impact, the report continues:
“Due to the direct intervention in the field approach adopted by UPE, the issue of
participation and partnership assumes greater importance than in the more
conventional modalities of development projects. This issue and the way it should be
approached links closely to cultural attitudes of the community and call for
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strengthening project elements that aim at better understanding the beneficiaries from
a socio-cultural aspect.”
What emerges is a mixture of units of impact in IDRC’s work that includes individual
researchers, research organizations, fields, other development partners, community-based
organizations, direct beneficiaries, and, of course, policy makers. These are all targets of
capacity development while at the same time being targets of practice change. In its early
days, IDRC appears to have been founded on a fairly straightforward and simple theory of
change: that capacity development would lead to knowledge change which would lead to
practice and policy change. The tensions revealed in the program reviews and cross-case
analysis suggest that, based upon years of experience and achievement, to go to what we’ve
been calling “the next level,” IDRC would benefit from a more sophisticated theory of
change, one that explicitly posits and takes into account the multiple and complex factors that
actually produce sustainable change.
The RPE program review was particularly incisive about the impact tensions and trade-offs
involved:
“The choice between government and civil society partners is also a choice between
supporting project partners with the capacity to undertake policy reforms but with
whom IDRC does not have as much leverage, and partners whose work can be
influenced but who have less policy change capacity.”
This conclusion captures succinctly the interaction between impact and priority audience and
provides an excellent segue to the final tension we offer for analysis: audience priority
tensions. All of the tensions overlap and intersect, and audience priority tensions follow
closely from unit of impact tensions. The difference is that unit of impact draws our attention
to consider what results are of greatest strategic importance.
This final tension emerges from the central role and function of scientific knowledge as a
prized output at IDRC. Knowledge has to be directed to someone, understood by someone,
consumed by someone, and used by someone. Audience priority tensions emerge because
there are always multiple “someones” – multiple knowledge consumers and users,
3.5 Tension: Audience Priority
As just noted, IDRC inevitably has many important audiences. By virtue of its charter, its
role as a quasi-government agency and the nature of development work, IDRC necessarily
must straddle the multiple audiences of international development organizations,
governments and field based organizations. IDRC’s values and perspectives derived from its
authorizing act and further developed by its corporate strategy, staff and programs compel
the organization to take seriously its aims to support processes that reinforce pluralism, self-
determination and diversity.
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Given what IDRC is, these audiences cannot, nor should they, go away. But tensions among
the range of audiences are real and in the real world decisions are inevitably made that favor
one or another. One reviewer captured a clear example when looking at the tradeoff between
the greater rate of success evidenced when projects worked with governments versus the time
and uncertainty of access, readiness and success when working with civil society
organizations. There is no fiat that can resolve this tension. It does, however, warrant
ongoing consideration of program and project aims and how they advance corporate aims.
The UPE review raised a concern about the tension experienced as projects encounter
participant expectations about receiving the benefit of a development intervention as opposed
to contributing to development research.
The RPE review points to a direct tradeoff between audiences:
“ The choice between government and civil society partners is also a choice between
supporting project partners with the capacity to undertake policy reforms but with
whom IDRC does not have as much leverage, and partners whose work can be
influenced but who have less policy change capacity.
How issues like this are managed is central to the IDRC mission and drives home the need
for more careful work aligning capacity building with policy influence and how IDRC
communicates its intents.
Within capacity building, standards of research excellence, discussed earlier, favor an
academic audience, whereas standards of “good enough” might reflect the needs and
demands of policy makers. Of course, this will vary by setting and project. High stakes
decisions with associated high costs may require more and better knowledge than would
lower stakes decisions where “good enough” might apply. The point is that the nature of the
policy, the culture of information use, the time demands-- in essence the nature of the
particular audience can best determine what kind of policy research is best suited to the need.
Digging deeper into the concept of audience, one review raised the point that environmental
economics was not a high priority in SE Asia as environmental concerns are seen as taking
away from broader economic development. In Ecohealth the reviewers note that the original
concept of supporting efforts to foster community-based health seemed to resonate more in
Latin America than in other areas and that this might reflect the region’s long term history
with these ideas. This point raises for us the issue of understanding the market for IDRC
programs beyond that of interested individual researchers. In other words, is there a
sufficient champion base to assure IDRC that investment in a project reflects its strongly held
principle of self-determination. We have not seen much discussion in the reviews of
IDRC’s advocacy stance as it invests in newer fields.
The point of this discussion is that audience tensions need to be managed as a whole rather
than one by one and that the time demands of influencing policy versus that of academic
research are likely to be very different. Without explicit attention, decisions will still be
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Part 4: Concluding thoughts
Nobel Prize winning social scientist Herbert Simon said: “The series of decisions which
determines behavior over some stretch of time may be called a strategy.” Henry Mintzberg
credits this observation with having put him on the trail of investigating strategy. In his most
recent book, Tracking Strategy (2007), Mintzberg reported business case studies focused on
how organizational behaviors (not just plans, intentions, and decisions, but behaviors)
revealed strategy and explained results.
In this analysis we have been tracking strategy at IDRC as revealed in the patterns of actions
and behaviors captured and reported in program reviews and related strategic and evaluation
documents. We want to emphasize that this analysis was only possible because IDRC has
been consistently rigorous in commissioning independent program reviews and seriously
evaluating the implementation and outcomes of IDRC’s strategic framework and global
initiatives. These reviews and evaluations document considerable success. We have
positioned this analysis as offering the possibility of building on past successes and learnings
to go to the next level of excellence and performance in the further evolution of IDRC as a
world class institution.
As we identified and tracked IDRC’s strategies and their implementation as revealed in
program reviews, tensions surfaced among competing outcomes and ways of doing
development work. We began, using Mintzberg’s framework, with the tension between
strategy as perspective vs. strategy as position. A key challenge here is to align perspective
and position rather than treating them as separate and discrete elements (essentially silos).
Looking then at the tensions between capacity building versus policy influence, we surfaced
implications for how IDRC might look at the different kinds of skills and competencies
needed to conduct scientifically rigorous research versus building strong, credible, and
influential relationships with policy makers and practitioners. We then turned to a key
distinction in the management literature between strategy and execution, and the importance
of being able to distinguish inadequacies or failures in strategy from those emanating from
weak implementation and execution. Program reviews consistently failed to make this
distinction when identifying strengths and weaknesses, and we suggest that attention to the
distinction between strategy formulation and strategy execution would be illuminating as
IDRC looks to the future. The final three tensions surfaced address how problems are framed
in macro terms while programs and/or the means by which they are executed tend toward
micro interventions. We believe too that it is worthwhile to consider more deeply how
different units of impact require different strategies and different measures of success, and
how the demands and needs of different audiences (the international research community
versus local policy makers versus needy intended beneficiaries) might shape IDRC future
decisions.
At the center of these tensions was an overarching tension at the level of strategic
perspective: Capacity Building versus Policy Influence. This tension, we posit, is the central
overarching tension played out through the intersecting, integrated system of overlapping and
interacting sub-tensions illustrated in the graphic on the next page.
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We found that the variety of issues surfaced in program reviews could be better understood
and illuminated when viewed through the lens of strategic perspective: alignment and tension
between the two central vehicles by which IDRC delivers its value, Capacity Building and
Policy Influence. As we have illustrated above, it is difficult to think about audience without
thinking about “for what?” and the audience for policy and the audience for research are not
the same, nor do they judge success in the same way (unit of impact and micro/ macro), nor
























believe that if the strategic process that IDRC is about to embark on gives serious attention to
this core tension, many of the other tensions observed will slacken or will become more
manageable.
The relationships among the tensions are complex and dynamic because the global
development environment within which IDRC works is complex. Complex adaptive systems
manifest characteristics of high uncertainty, dynamism, and emergence – dimensions that are
at the heart of Mintzberg’s insistence that intended strategy, as planned, is never fully
realized but always intersects with emergent and unanticipated factors that change strategy
execution on the path to what is eventually realized.
We highlight this in closing to emphasize our opening discussion of tensions, in which we
suggested that the focus should be on managing, navigating, and negotiating tensions, not
resolving them or even choosing among them. This also means not ignoring them. Ignoring
them won’t make them go away. It just means that their effects won’t be as quickly, or ever,
understood. Without recognition of these tensions, and guidance and support from senior
management, IDRC staff in the field will continue to make it up as they go along and
program reviewers will report confusion and concerns about the disparities between plans
and what actually occurs on the ground, between high hopes for multiple outcomes and the
challenges experienced about which outcomes deserve priority, and at every level and every
stage, tensions between capacity building and policy influence as overarching strategic goals.
From our experience working with many funders in North America, the kinds of strategic
tensions we have discussed in this paper are far from unusual. In fact, the issues discussed
here, although different in content, are quite similar to most foundations. What is different is
that, in many ways, IDRC is advanced over other foundations in its commitment to doing a
few things well and evaluating what results. We have no question that IDRC is in a strong
position to build on its past history and take strategy to the next level of excellence.
